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This artid~ builds upon dassic ecomJmic perrpecIives "r[mandal bt'ha1!ior by applyin9 Ihe narratn'l' identity 
perspa:tive of cultural wdolngy 10 explain how /ower-income familie; respond /0 indebtedness. Drawing <In in.Jeplh 
qualitative intervit'w.i with 194 /ower-ilWlme househ<JW hruds, we s/ww thaI debt m01Ul!Jmlffl/stralegies are injlu-
mad by a desire to promol£ a financially responsible. self-sufficient social identity. "amilies are rehlltant w ask fl.>T 
assistance whenfaad wilh eamomic hardship b«ause it undermines Ihis identity. Hwluse the nml to pay on debts 
is less acul£ lhan 1M nml to pay for "!Jular mmthly Clpense!' Iilre rent or ~ debts rereive a iowcr primly 
in the man/hly hudget and familia typia/lly jU9!J/e their debts in pma1£ rather than turning /Q socW/ networks 
for assislana. In scme cases, hOM\'VeT. debts lake em spetio/ m£anmgs and are handled differently. Respundent5 
priMilize debts when they ~ paymall (l$ affirmin!J a wlfsufJlCiml or upwardly mooile identity. bul they 
n:jeJ1 and ignu" debt); they view as u"fair or u"just.. BetaU$e In", priml£ coping Slralegies fami/it:; "''''Ploy Irap 
IIII'm in COSily ~ ofindeblruness and /linMr fUtuw mobilil)' prospeas. di'bl manll9ffl1e11/ S/rall'flies are conSi't/uffl -
lial for Ion.'1·I..,.", financial lIIt'll·bring. Keywords; finanaa/ behavior; deb/; I'fVnomic mohility; romomic copin9 
slrali'gil'S; quali/ati\'e melhods. 
Lower·income families have always faced runiers to economic mobility. but the types ()f 
runiers they face have changed with the expansi()n of credit markets. Historically. disadvantaged 
households lacked access to credit as a tool for economic mobility or income smoothing.. so they 
bad few debts even though experiellces of economic hardship were common (Katz 1996; Licbow 
1967; Stack 1974). This changed during the 1980s with the dercgulati()ll of the credit industry 
and expansion of credit markets. AJtbough offering unprecedented opportunities to usc credit to 
promote economic sWbility and mollility, consumer debt skyrod;:eted as a n.:su lt of th t'"SC chang ... ,:; 
j Bird. Hagstmm, and w ild 1997; Draut and Silva 2003; Lyons 2003; Weller 2006), mntrihutillg to 
widening wealth inequality and making indehtedness a key ~)lJree of stratificatioll in nmkmpo-
rary Americall s(K..;ety (Lcicilt 2012) . 111 {aLt, hy 2006, the rkhe~t JO pelL"Cnt of Americans 
held two-thirds of the nation's wealth, while the bottom fifth had a negative oct worth IMishcl, 
Ilernstein, and Allcgrello 2007) . 
The expansion of credit markets increased indebtedness across the income distribution, 
but this has been particularly problematic for lower-income families (Lyons 2003). These families 
have found it increasingly difficult to pay their debt obligations because tbeir assets and earning:; 
have not grown as tbey did for weal thier Americans (Misbc1. Bernstein, and Shlerbolz 2009). 
They have al50 faced additioual economic rub; as income voliltility rose, medical costs skyrocketed , 
and the sodal safety nel eroded. As a ft"Suli. by 2004, almost half of very- low-income fa milit':; 
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jwith annual inromes under $1 0.000) and over one quarter oflow- and moderate-income families 
j$IO,OOO to $50,000) spent more thilll 40 percent of their take-home income to payoff deb-t 
jWeUer 2006). The sources of lower-income families' debts also pla.ce them at a disadvillltage rda-
tive to more afflue[l\ families, il5 they are less likely to have investment debt. such as mongagcs, 
aDd more likely to have high-inleft'St or U1l5ccured debt, such as credit cards (Ai7.corbc. KCIlllickeU, 
aDd Moore 2003).1 
Dt"Spile the rising prevalcnt'C of indehtedness, sociologists have devoted little attention to 
how houschold~ manage th is growing sourt"C of finauria] strain. Imtead, emnolllic theories 
have dominated the academic and IK)lity ulUlcrstanding of the debt behaviors of low-income 
households. Emnomic models of finanria] behavior eliarat1.eri7.c mudl of the indebtedness of 
the poor as "irrational, ~ and allribute their finanoal behaviors to Mpsyehological errors.· This 
work has not studied the social mntexts in which debts are accrued or repaid or the meanings 
individuals attribute to their indebtedness. Sociologisl~ have not devoted substantial empirical 
attention to these questions either, but perspedives within cultural sociology suggest that the 
social and finanrial identities held by lower-income families sbould influence their behavioral 
responses to debt. 
I.n the present study, we build OIJ classic economic perspedives of finalJdal behavior by 
applying the narrative identity perspective of cultural sociology to explain how lower-income 
fammes rt"Spond to indebtedness. Drawing o n in-depth qualitilt.ive interviews with thc household 
heads of 194 lower-income families lwith annual incomes undef $40.000 in 2(07), we show that 
families' debt management strategies arc influenL"Cd by their desire to promote a finandally 
responsib-Ie, self-sufficient sodal identity. Families are reluctant to ask for assistance when faced 
with economic hardship beca use it undermines this identity. The need to l),3y on deb-IS is often less 
aeute than the need to pay for regular monthly expenses like relll or groceries, so debts receive a 
lower priority in the monthly budget illld families juggle their debts in private rather than turning 
to social networks for assistance. III some cases, however, debts take on sperial meanings for 
rcslxmdents and they handle them differently as a result. They prioriti7.c debts when they perceive 
paymelJt il5 affirming a self-sufficient and upwardly mobile identity, but they rejed and ignore 
debts that arc perceived as lIDjust or uIDair. Thus, t.be strategies that families use to manage ilieir 
debts arc grounded in cultu ra l narratives of sc1f-suflidency and respOlJsibility. 
Background 
Models of Debl Behavior 
Economists have dominated the study of individual financial decision making. The traditional 
rational aeror model of behavior posits that individuals are "rational, hold coherent, wdl-infonned 
b-clicfs, illld pursue their goals effedivcly, with little systematic error and no need for bclp~ 
j Mullainatban and Shafir 2009: 12 1). Under this modeJ, taking on debt is a rational respome to 
certain liIe conditions, sucb as financing future mobility in tbe form of education o r smoothing 
consumption temporarily following a drop in income. Traditional ecolJornic models also assume 
that money is Ll)mpletely fu ngible- that all money is eq ual and interchangeable. Thus, the ratio-
lJal actor model wO\lld predit1. that individuals lreat all dollars owed as e(luivalclJl and payoff their 
debt~ 10 minimize their total cust; in most cases, thi~ meam prioritizing debts with the highes t 
interest rates and balanL"CS. 
Recent developments in behavioral eUlnomics have eritici1.cd the ra tional actor model. draw -
ing on psychological principles to argue that human behavior is not fully rational but Ulntext 
I. The I>'-'Tn-ni of low-iuromc lamilk'S wilh crewl car<!s ;I](T(-"",-d frorn 201>'--"'''";1] 19831040 rc<ccTJI iu 2001 and Ihe 
I'TOl'ort;"n 01 low _;n,urnc I3mili<:>; wilh cn.~lil ,,, ,,1 1,,,1.>,,,",,,, mOrt' Ihan Iwite Iheir ",,,,,,hly i," .... H~" wo:nl hum 1 in 10 h> 1 in 
8 during 'hal I",,'od (f>"H>I a'Nt Silva 2003). 
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dependent (Mullainathan and Shafir 2009; Thaler and SUllSlcin 2008; Tversky and Kahnelllilll 
1974). In this view, individuals are strongly influenced by situational factors; they do not perceive 
and interpret the world around them objectively. Although the recognltion of contextual influ-
ences is lbcoretkaJJy imponant, tbe behavioral eronomic model of debt behavior continues to 
characterize devimions from rational action in teTTll5 of psychological "crrors." For cxample, be-
bavioral cconomists have notcd tbat individuals rcvcn to default options cven wbcn thcy arc 
not thc optimal choice; they discount future bchaviors, placing !toss valuc on their SliltllS iJl the 
future than in the present; and they are loss averse, valuing an objeL1 mOTe when it i~ in their 
possession than when il is not (Thaler and SUllstein 200M; Tven;ky and Kahneman 1974). Most 
re(."ently, behavioral e(l)Jlo Jll ist~ have noted that such psychological errors may he more (l)stly 
for the poor, as they have less financial cushion [0 shield tllem in the wake of such errors 
03lank and Barr 2009; Mullainathan and Shafir 2009). The behavioral economic perspective 
has become influential in the policy world, informing IlOlides targeted at improving the savings 
and spending dedsion making of the poor (sec, for example, Thaler and SWlStein 2008) . 
Despitc its scnsitiviry to contextual factors, thc behaviorill economic model hilS a limited 
understanding of the actual social COnlexlSin which the lXlor navigatc tbeirfiJJanciallives. Bchavioral 
CCOlJom.i5ts often manipulate colllex(S in laboriltories or otber colllrolled cxpcrimcnwl settings, 
overlooking the importancc of sudill identities and subjective meanings developed in the reill 
world for explilini.ng behavior. Thus, they cannot explain why iJldividuals rL"Spond hetero-
geneously to the same "objL~ive~ situations. Behavioral L~nomists have improperly and unfa-
vorahly CharaL1erized (lllture as an explanation ror ht~havior, often using the outdated ·culture 
of poverty" Ihesis of the I 960s. ror example, Sendhil Mullainathan and Etdar ShaHr (2009) 
recently argued that cultural modeL~ of behavior "attribute a variety of psychological and atti -
tudinal shortcomings to the poor, presumed to be endemic, that render the views of the POOf 
misguided ilnd ill infonned, their behaviors impulsive and lacking. and their choices fallible, thal 
leave them in necd of paternalistic guidance" w. 121). 
The field of cultural sociology has made significillll ildvilnces since the culture of poverty 
thcsis fell OUi of favor jsee Lamont and 2008; Small, Harding, and Lamont 2010 for revicws). It 
lJOW providcs il lJuallced set of perspectives to undcrstillld how context infl uc lJces individua.l 
perceptions and dc:cisions. Individ uals develop iln understan ding of themselves and their sur-
roundiJlgs thilt ca n be observed in the personal narrilti ves, or stories, they tell. These narra-
tives, in turn, shape their actions (Ewick and Silbey 2003; Pollctta 2006; Somers 1994). This 
narrative identity perspeclive argues that, when faced with JIl ultiple l."Ourscs or action, people will 
pursue the path that is most l.'(JIlSislent with their personal lla rratives and self-conce ptions, 
rather than a path that might seem most rat ional 10 an outsider I Lamont and Small 2008). In 
this framework, the narratives one has developed 10 make sense of one's life guide one's 
actions. rather than fational calculations Of cognitive biases. Narratives have been used to 
understilnd a diverse array of actions rdilled to social mobility tAbelmann 2003; Pones and 
RumbaUl 2001; Young 2004), but to our knowledge they have not been used to explain vari-
ation in financial bebaviors related to debt. For OUf purposes, tbe narrative ideotity perspec-
tive predicts tbat individuals take actions towards tbeir debts that support, filther tban 
undcrmine, tbc finandal identities they have developed. We can observe these finanoilJ 
scLf-u)fIceptions thrOllgh the personal narriltives they recoun\. 
Prior Re ... earch on Financial Behavior 
Despite lhe advanCC5 sociologists have made in theorizing the behaviors of the poor, they 
largely have overlooked how social identities may affect financial decision making. One notable 
exception is the work or Viviana Zelizer (1994) who, in an historical analysis of housewives, gang 
members, and prostitutcs (anlong others), found thill people eannark different currcllcies for 
particular types of social interactions. alld rcslXllld with ilnger 10 the misuse of monies for the 
wrong circumstanccs or within illappropIiate social rclillions. This directly challenges the rational 
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actor model 's assumption thill money is fungible. And unlike the behavioral economic model's 
focus on psychological influences. ZeUzer shows that the detenninillion of an appropriille or 
inappropriate usc of money is highly dependent upon the social rclillions in which the transaction 
was embedded and the soda] identitit-s of those illvolved. 
The empirical work of poverty scholars has I(lrgely overlooked 7..cli7.cr's cultllf(ll iosigh!:; 
in thei.r studies of the fin.mdal be h(lviors of the poor, pilrticul(lrly those related to debt Most 
S()ciologk"al rescareh on debt has uscd (Iuantitativc data to cxamine disparitics in wealth and debt 
by raL'r, class, and age (Conley 1999, 200 I; Keister 2000a, 2000b, 2004; Keister and Moller 2000; 
Oliver and Shapiro 1995) or to tra('r the traje(tories of debt (lnd wealth aeculllulation over the lifc 
cyde a nd ilS consequences for economic mobility [Lundy 2011; McCloud and Dwyer 20 11; 
Shdrin and Thaler 1988) . Although this work has provided important information about the 
enormous d ispari ties in debts a nd asselS between advantaged and disadvantaged sodal groups and 
the structural soura'S of these disparities. it has not explored the micro-level decision-making 
processes fanillies usc to man(lge tbeir deblS. 
In contrast, qualiwtive work on the economic coping strategies of the poor has l(lrgcly 
ignored debt. In their semin(lj work Makin9 Ends Meet ( 1997), which details the economic coping 
strategies of low-in come single mothers on weUilre (lnd in the low-wilge I(loor milrket, K(llh.ryn 
Edin and La ura Lein found that current and fonner welfare redpienl~ gencrated extra incomc 
by working at side jobs and by obtaining assistance from members of their sodaJ ndworks, 
community groups, and local charities. Other researchers have corroborated these results, finding 
that low-inoome families draw on networks, supplemental employment, and nnnprofit assistance 
tn mitigate material hardship (Hill and Kauff 2001; Mistry and Lowe 2006; Polit, London, and 
Martinez 2000). Rashmiw Mistry and Edward Lowe (2006) found that fanillies distinguisb 
between spending on "basics,· ·extras," and · big ticket items,· and these types of spending hold 
different meanings. Fo r example, keeping abreast of monthly bills was associated with feeling 
"okay: but modest extras aDd bigger ticket items were assodated with feelings of pride ilod 
accompUshment. Bc..."Gl use of t his, mothers were motivatl.-d to rmd wilys to not only secure their 
basic needs bul also to be (l ble to ilfford some mod(""S1 extl"il spending, such ilS eating oul or buying 
something spcoill for their children. 1.1:1 Ihis way, the feelings associ(lted with different expendi-
tures infl uenced the strategies mothers used to obtain them. 
One st riking fca\lJre of these ill-depth aCmunl\ of (jnandall~haviors among lower-incomc 
families is that deb t is virtually absent from them. There are several reasons why this might be 
the case. First, respondents may not have been asked about debt , so it did not oome up in the 
intervicws. If rcspondents did not initiate the topic of debt when discussing economic coping strat -
egies, perhaps it was because they viewed tbe process of making e nds meet on a monthly basis 
differently than they viewed their oUlStandillg deblS. A second possibility is that populations who 
bave been interviewed about economic coping strategics were typicalJy the most disadvaDwged, 
often current or fOmler welfare reopicDIS. Tbese familics may Dot bilve qualified for credit cards 
or they mily have r ("C(iwd free mediQlI assistance ilnd subsid i:zed housing, reS\llting in very little 
dehLIf this is the case, the problems o f indebtedness lIIay reach higher U]I the ill("Ome ladder than 
the populations tradilion(llly studied in thc literature 011 (""(~lIlom i c OJpillg stratcgies . Indehtedn("Ss 
may aJ~) havc heemne more L"O mmon for this 1)()lmlatioll following welfarc rdorm and credit 
deregulation (Ullwi.n 2008). 
Indeed, there is evidence 10 support this laller explanation. In The Missin_4 Cidss (2007), 
Katherine Newman and Victor Tan Chen follow nine families they dassify as the "ncar poor;" 
those wbo Uve in hQusebolds earning incomes between $20.000 and $40,000 for a family of four. 
NeWUlilJJ aDd Cben Dote Ihat the f<lIl1ilics tbey study arc about TWice as likely as poor families to 
bave credit cilrds. and they provide accounlS of the toll credi t card debt has wken Oll the families . 
While their gO(ll was not iI detailed ilnalysis of debt coping strategies, they do deS(Tibe economic 
(1Ipillg strategies uscd by individual fam ilics, including reliance on social networks and credit 
cards (Newman and Chell 2007:67-69). In addition to Newman and Chcn's work, Deborah 
Thome and Leon Anderson [2006) studied the role o f stigma in the decisi()[] to file for bankruptcy 
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among married couples. Research shows that bankruptcy is a debt management strategy utilized 
primarily by the middle class, not the poor jWarren 2003; Warren and Thorne 2012). These 
in-depth examinations of the ncar poor and middle class arc an imponant foWl dation for the 
present study, which provides a detailed examination of the range of debt coping su<ltegies 
utilized by tbe poor and near poor. 
In the present study, we use tbe narrative idelllity perspective to explain lower-incomc 
families' financial behavior, fOCllsing on how they understand and manage their indebted-
ness. Using interview data, we fiP.lt document levels and types of indebtedness and then 
analyze the sources of finam.ial support families utilized to assist with their debl bu rdens. 
We fi nd that respomlenb aspired 10 financially responsible, self-sufficient social identities, 
and were reluctant to rely on forma l or informal ass istance for their debts. Instead, they 
developed an eXlensive set of personal coping strategies to manage their bills in private . 
Next, we categori:l.e the varied personal debt coping strategies families adopted and exam -
ine their motivations fo r using each strategy. We conclude by discussing the implications of 
tbese private debt coping strategies for the reprod uction of sodal inequalit1cs and for asset-
building and debt-reduction policies. 
Data and Method 
We draw our da ta from in-depth quali tative interviews with the household heads of 194 
lower-in(.·orlle families with ann ual houschold inulmes under $40,000. Respondents were sam-
pled from two cities-Boston, MA and Champaign- Urbana, fL-as part of a large study of families 
who received the Earned Income Tax Credit jEITC), a federal tax credit for whid l families qualify if 
they have earned income and children. The EITC provides an ideal sampling frame for reaching 
lower-income families, as the qualifying income Jimjt in 2007 (when our data were collected) was 
$37,783 for a family with two or more children. Take-up of the EITC is high among eligible families 
jover 75 percent), suggesting that this sampling frame covers most lower-income families (Plueger 
2(09). The two sites were selected to capture variation in urbanidty and cost of living. altbough our 
anillyses revealed few differences between tbe two sites regarding indebtedness, so we eombinc 
them in our analyses. 
We first sampled resJXmdents at random sampling intervals from three types of Ilx:ations a t 
each site during Jan uary 10 April of 2007- for- pmfit tax preparation sites, nonprofit tax prepara-
tion sites, and Head Start eenteTS--and condlKted a short survey with those who filed an Eamed 
Income Credit t mC) sdledule.1 We sought a racially and ethnically diverse sample, so we sampled 
tax prCJlaration sites and Head Start centers based on the racial and ethnic composition of the 
conununities they served. Respondents completed a short survey asking for basic demographic 
and economic inforulation and contact information for follow- up in-deptb interviews. 
In the second phase, we selected a stratified random sample of survey respondents for 
in-depth interviews about six months after tbey were initially interviewed. The sample was strati -
fied by site 179 in Champaign-Urbana and 115 in Boston). by raeefethnidty (even mffilbers of 
white and blilek households in Champaign-Urbana and even numbers of wbite, blilck, and 
Hispanic houscbolds in Boswn), and by fa mily strunure (within each city and racialfethn1c sub-
group, we sampled thJ(."(; single houschold heads for every one mankd couple ftling their taxes 
jOintly). Rl"SIKlllse rates for both phas(."S of sampling were over 90 pcrttnl. 
2. Sampling interval. were randomly .chedule<l on evel)'dayof {he week in {he morning. af{emoon. and everting. We 
administered {he.urveY" immedia{ely aher respondent. fi~ {heir {ax ..... We also sampled families a{ a",a Uead Stan reme~ 
{o bdpGlp{"'" somc bO<JSeholds wbo did 001"", a I""' proli{ o.nOflprofn aw:n'1' {o me, hut p"'[lilTed {bt-ir {ax<", {hcmsdv<"S. 
RougWy 70 p<'Jn-n{ of a U llffC da;rnam. [ile at " lor-prol;II"" renlcr, and {he remaining 30 pc"",,,I1Um 10 family and Irk"T\d.s.. 
file 1I .. :rn«:/v,:s, or u«: LII,,: scrvi<'cs of a nonp.ofiL organi'_'1 iun . Ikad SL:r1l Cl;n' er'S w,,'" an "'feni"" n :<Tninr .. :"L .ile I ... -m".., 
Ihe [",nidp,,'ing families arc also rnool ly EITC c!igihk,. 
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At both sites, a team of trained intervlewers conduded the intervlews with respondents 
following the uliliilJ surveys. All interviews were conducted in person; 90 percent took plaee 
in respondents' homes, me rest took place in public locations such as coffee shops. fast food 
reSlilurants, parks, or libraries. Interviews averaged 2.5 hours in length, rilnging from 1.5 to 
4.5 hours. During each interview, we asked both open- and close-coded Questions about: income 
aod expenses; flnil.I10al Imowlcdge and bebilvior. Silvings, debts, aod ilssets; economic coping 
striltegics; home and work life; hou~i.ng and neighborhood; family background; il.nd mobility 
aspirations. In addition, we o)llected detailed information alx)ut the type and amount of each 
source of inUlme <-'oming into the household fmm al! family members; cadI type of expenditure 
made in the past month and the amount; the type and amount of eadl asset held; and the type 
and amnunt of cadI debt held including interest rates and balances. After collecting this detailed 
Quantitative information on household budgets, we asked open-ended Qualitative Questions that 
elidted narratives about how each debt had been accrued. how respondenl~ prioritized their 
expenses if they did nOl have enough income to cover them all, and me coping srrategies they 
used to make ends meet. 
All interviews were il udio-rccorded. transcribed. and coded into both numeric and tbcmilt ic 
fields. We analyzed numeric inIormation. such as the detailed ilccounting of debts. using Quanti-
tative tecllniQ1K"S. Thematic qualitative data, such as the deosion-making pnx:esscs around debt 
accumulation and repayment, mobility goals, and the use of government ilssistancc and sodal 
suppon were soned i.nto broad topical GllCgori<-"S, <-"Oded inductively, and analyz<--d by examining 
patterns among the <-"Odes. To preserve omfidentiality, all reslxmdents alld family members were 
assigned pseudonyms and I)()tentially identifying details in the narratives presented below have 
been altered. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive characteristics of respondeills in our s.ample. Most of the 
household heads we i.nterviewed were women. Our Silmple is evenly divided among blacks, 
whites, and Latinos. and roughly one-third of the households were married, consistent with our 
stratified s.ampUllg strategy. Households had, on average. about 2.5 children and household 
beads were on ilve.rage 34 years old. AboUl one quarter of the sample had a higb school degree 
or less, and over half hild completed ilt leilst some college, most often coTl1Dlunity college or a 
training program at a proprietary in~1it\ltion. The average annual household earnings i.n our 
sample WilS $24,28 1 in Boston and $2 1,672 in ChamJ)3ign-U rbana, with an additionill $3,000 
to $4,000 in housdlOld imxIITle fmlll government cash assistancc, such as welfarc, social secu-
rity, and disability paymenl~. Boston respondenl~ had $7,S06, on average, in oul~ tanding debt 
ami Cha mpaign-U rbana rcspondellL~ had $ IIA08. Dcbt-to-income ratios, a measure of debt 
burden, were 34 IlCrcent on average in Boston and 38 percent in Champaign-Urbana. There 
were few differences across our two sites, except that Boston had more foreign born respond-
ents and more families reSiding in subsidized housing, while Champaign-Urbana had more 
homeowners, whose mortgages made tOlaJ debt and debt-to-income ratios higher there than 
in Boston. 
Results 
Type ... of Debt 
The vast majori ty of rCSlxmdcnlS in OUI" samplc rcp·orted they had debt, hut the level and 
type of indebtedncss varied considerahly_ Only I I famil ies j 5. 7 peR"ell t) had 110 oul~tanding debl. 
One-fourth of debtor.; owed less than $800, while anOlher quarter owed more than $8,000. 
J1amilies often had multiple types of debts. Just 14 percent of the s.ample had exactly one debt. 
Twenty-six percent of respondents had two kinds of debt. 23 percent had three kinds of debt, and 
3 1 percent of the sample had four or more differcnt types of debt. 
Table I • Respomkm Characleri~lici 
S"x 
Female 
.w, 
Racell1hnicity 
IJlack 
Whlte 
Latinu 
Nativity 
Fureign born 
ClIfTCnl relationship Slatus 
Married 
Unmarried 
McLIn 1/ d,ildrell 
Meanalo:e 
Housinlo: status 
Homeuwner 
Nonsubsidized renter 
Subsidized relller 
Other arrangement 
Employment status during pa51 year 
Full time omy 
Part limc unly 
Full <lnd part limc 
Ildurntional <l1t.,il1TJ1cnl 
LL-;.~ than hi);h s.:hlK,1 
High school/GE l) 
Some college 
Associme's dcgn-e 
Bachelors degn-e 
Post-bachelors degree 
Me<ln allIlual inromc 
Househuld eamings (S) 
Househuld income (earnings + 
govl-romelll a ssistance) (S) 
Rl-ceived SNAP in past year (%) 
Mean debl amOll l1l ($) 
Mean dcbt-tu-im:ome r<l[iu 1%) 
N 
Full Sample 
.80 
.14 
.'14 
.J8 
" 
AI 
." 
2.'18 
33.95 
23.219 
26,88 1 
<0 
9.095 
36 
'" 
.14 
.29 
AJ 
." 
.'18 
." 
.20 
. 10 
." 
.33 
.29 
.09 
.OJ 
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.90 
.'" 
.10 .20 
.35 .58 
.35 .42 
.30 00 
35 05 
" " 
" " 2.'16 2.51 
34.41 33_29 
.10 .20 
.18 .'M 
.w .18 
.12 .18 
" 
.., 
.36 
" 
" 
.25 
" '" 
" 
.22 
.J5 .30 
.2> .35 
." .m 
.0 1 .00 
24,281 2[.672 
27,78 1 25,570 
" " 7,506 11;108 
H 38 
"5 
" 
NNts: Val ..... are proponions unl .... otherwise nOled. Inrome valUe< are in 2007 doUars. Annual earnings fmmjobs or 
self-employment Government assi<tana: from welfare. social security. disability. or olhercash a<";stana:. 
Table 2 shows the percentage of res!X)ndents holding different types of debts and the average 
size of those debts. Credit card debt was the most common, with 60 percelll of res!X)ndents repon-
ing an average credit card balance of $4 ,705. Many respondents were delinquCllt on utili ty a nd 
pbolle bills (12 percent). bmtbese balances were comparatively small ($873 ou average). While 
relatively few n:spoudents owned bomes and bad mortgage paymeIl1s t 13 percent), many b,ld 
educational debt from various forms of higher education, ranging from trade <Ind tech.nica.l 
schools to commUllity coUeges (34 percelll ) with an average [J.)lant'C of $8,3 12. Many rl"Spon-
dents had taken out loam; for cars (42 percent), ollVing all average of $8,47 1. Mt"(iical debt was 
also tmnrnon, with 2S percent of our sample owing an average of $4,8S4 in medical hills. 
, 
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Table 2 • T)I1N'S aM AmounLf of lkbf among RespomknLf 
N with p""", Mean Medial! SD Min M~ 
"''' 
I<;/h Oebl (dol/ars) (dol/ars) (dol/ars) (do/lars) (dIJ/Iars) 
No debt II 5.7 
Crrol! card 115 59.6 4.705 1.430 8.795 150 52.000 
Car loon 
'" 
41. 5 8.741 7.500 7.923 99 3D,OOO 
Utilities 
'" 
41.5 
'" 
250 1.234 50 3,500 
Education 65 33.7 83 12 '.000 13.324 '50 81,000 
MI.-weal 
" 
25.4 4,854 1,250 9,608 
'" 
40,000 
Mortgage 25 13.0 196.700 103,500 174,695 2.500 500,000 
~ank 
" 
11.9 1,6M 700 2,826 68 8.Il00 
I'arnilyilricnd 
" 
8.3 533 500 
'" 
300 800 
Back renl 
" 
5.7 6,970 4 ,000 7.618 1,500 lO,ODO 
Horne g'KMis 
" 
5.7 1.299 1,000 2,312 50 6,O()(J 
Other car COS\S 9 .., USD 1.550 1.06] 
"" 
2,300 
Nonbank Loons 6 3. 1 10,765 9.050 19,490 ' ,000 40,000 
Legal bills , 2.' 1,000 1.000 601 50 900 
Oiller 15 7.8 9.050 4.000 J 1.950 600 17.500 
HOlD: Mean median. standard deviation. min. and IllilX based on respondents who held thal tl'P" 01 debt. TOial N = 191. 
Pinally. 12 percenL of rcsJlo[](k[]l~ owed money to banks for personal loans. Smaller [lUmbers 
of ra[[JiJiL~ owed money to family or friends, J or had other oU L~tanding bills related to rent or 
legal fees. 
Narrat ives of Self -Sufficiency 
RcspondeDls espoused a strong desire to be finalldally self-reliant despite their fragile 
financial cond.itions. ConsisteDl with findings from other studies ~e.g., Uttwin 2008), tbey were 
reluctant to rely on financial support (rom exte[]ded kin or friendship networks, and felt even 
worse about relyirlg upon government Gilsh assistance. Iking able to i1chicvc self-sufliciency was 
iI considefilblc source of pride, wbilc being fora.-U to tum to network, i1nd eSIx.-cially government 
SUJlJlort was oflen <I m.Hter of shame. As TcsS<l Morales, a white milrried mother of three to ld us, 
her experience on welfare was 
lerrihle. I'll "ever do it al,:'li". II was Ihe worst t:Xl'criencc ... I we,,1 a lId !:Ul a .illh and gol 011 of it I wellare). 
GOI oil and worked ever since ... II was lerrible. I'll never go back 10 Ihem plaa.-s again. Never. II's nOllor 
me ... I was so embarrassed ... [would never go back ... I swore I would work Ihe resl of my life. I didn'l 
care how I worked or where I workcd, I would nevcr go back thcre again. Never. And I didn·t. 
Tessa's Quote reveals the shame virtually all of our respondents associated with receiving welfare, 
whieh motivated a s trong drive to be employed and to avoid being dq)endent. Another respondent, 
Pedro Rios. a married Hispamc father of four who works as a facilitil-s manager at a local school 
echoed this desire to be self-sufficient the importance of working in order to "be somebody. ~ and 
the need IU model this for his children: 
T lold Imy wikl T don'l wanl my kid SUI'l'ort •. :d hy wclfart: ... al the lirnt: t was wurkingand Twas maki,,!: 
gllod u"mey. I meau. uol good mOlley. enough mOlley In [lay "'ybills. so I dorr'llikc to lake advan tage. 
Sn IIUld her, furget a buullhal. I mean. I'm working. I'm making mOlley ... ISulinr I li ke 10 stay away 
lrom Ihal lwelfarel ... We gnlla show Ihe kids in Ihe lulure Ihal you gOlta work liard to be somebody 
someday ... I like 10 progl1.-ss, I likc to work., I like to, yOll know. J-:ct what I gel withoul somcbody giving 
illo JIlC. 
1. '',is indu'ks (lilly l"lOS<: loans when; Ihcr" w.s ~n nl'caariull ll~>l lh<:y he l"'i,ll",<"l; many mOn; ",S!~"~k"'.s 
R"<'<:iv~.l inlonnal monctary a,,,I,,,,m''''''cla,), S"I1I~'<1 f,,~n Ihd r lric,,<ls ami ",13l i"".,;. 
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Pedro's desire to Mget what I get without somebody giving it to me" is consisteD! wi th a large 
body of research showing that welfare is highly stigmatized in the United States because it is 
perceived to conflict with American values of self-reliance and the bellef that able-bodied 
individuals should work (De Parle 2004; Ellwood 1988; Gilens 1999; Katz 1993). 
Mthough welfare was by far the most stigmali7.cd form of dependCllce among respondents in 
our siJJJlp1c, they also felt uncomfortable relying on their social networks for assist.1.nce because 
it lunflicted with their ideals of self-sufficiency. Mack Clark, a while mamed father of two, told us 
that "ii's depending on other people, Ihal'S what il is ... and I like to dept .. nd on myself." EdlOing 
this sentiment, Bryn Gamble, a single mother who works as a receptionist for an insuranc~ 
l-ompany, told us " [ 'rn not lazy. [ like my own. [really don'tUke for people to help me unless I 
really need it. M And Chanlelle Woodward, a single mother of two who works as a medical 
assis tant, declared: 
t just can't find myseU sitting hom(' aU the time and oot doing ootlting and watching th(' same 
shows, that's oot the lifestyle that I chose to live. . I'm a role modd for my daughter.;. I don' t 
waDi them to get inlO Ihm 10 where it's okay to just stay home aod rely 00 other.; aod don' , work 
aod doo'l think aboul respoosibilities, , , I'm a role model lor them aod I wd!JItllem 10 know in order 
10 gel Ihiogs ill life you have 10 cam it, you have to go OUI Ibere 30d gel iI, It's not gOTUla jus1 come 
1<1 YUll. 
We heard similar sentiments from the vast majority of respondents in o ur sample, who espoused 
values of self-reliance and rt."Sp!msibility, 
RespoTldeTll~ were relultant to rely OIl their social networks for £inanual support, hut they 
often fou nd themselves in situations where they had to ask for help, given their unpredictab!~ 
financial circumstances, When we asked about borrowing money from family or friends, one 
reslXlndent, a black single mother of two who worked as a nursing assistant, gave a response 
typical of many: 
I try not 10 bonow or I don't- well I don't lih· 10 borrow anyway, I mean that would be the last optioEl 
that I ope 10 is asking SOllt"Ooe else, Tbat's just me J)CfSOOaUy, I'd ratber wait, ortry 10 wait out, and set: 
if I can lind anOl"er way 10 gt1 il. 
Similarl y, another respondent answered our (Illesrion by sayi ng. MYea n, tnat's wnen I 
have to break down and have to ask, if it's r((llly Ijke needed wise, ['II have to ask like a sibl ing 
or something," When pll~hed about how many times that ha~ happened, she sa id Mprobahly 
twice if anythi[)g,~ Consistellt with these quotes, most respondents made it clear to us that 
they used their nclworks only as a last resort. 
Respondents ' descriptions of asking for help revealed that they drew on their network re -
sources only when they were in dire need of basic necessities that had an immediate impact on 
their well-being, In fact, 7S percent of rcslXlndents in our sample had relled on their social 
networks at some point in the recent past for help with basic necessities induding food, shelter, 
orst<Jple items for thcirchildren, In contrast, only 12 percent used network assistance to belp lllfitb 
their bills aDd debts, When they asked for help lllfith bills and debts, it was often because nonpay-
ment would resuJt in an immediate detrimeDtai effect on their well-being, such as keeping a seT-
vkc like heat or clCltridty from being disconnt-cted after months of nonJlayment. 
For examJlle, when asked how she had managed being unable 10 Jlay a bill in the last 
six months, LaWanda, a hlack single mother who works as an emergency Iiledicaltcchnidan, 
told us: 
Huw <1u I manage Ihat'! Strt'S.o;, seream, try, pray, There have hcen a I<:w limes where rnayhL~1 think the 
e1ccrridty bill or Ihe phone bill, you know, liley send me thaI 72- hour notice they're gonna shul il on 
~nd it's like oil, mommy, you gol $20'1 
This quote reveals LaWanda's preference to deal with her bills in private through stress, 
screaming. crying. and praying, prefening to wait to ask for help until nO! paying on a bill would 
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cause material discomfon for her family. Similarly, when we asked how she prioritized her 
bills when she couldn't pay all of them, Geniee, a single mother of two boys, said: 
11 depends on what the bill is and how bad it should be paid so it all depends on how bad it is and how 
bad it nt"t:d to be paid. Iltx"ilusc like myc3r note ... maybe 1 might ask my dad. "dad CiUl you. I borrow this 
so I can go back: to work and get tl:t.is [paYlched" and then r will give it [the paycheck] back to him. 
So, r mea.." il irs a dcs]"!"'h: nt!C<I. a <Ty lor hclp. lhcn yeah. flul. Olber Ihan lhat, no. 
Like most of our respondenL~ , Genicc waited until the need was -dtoospcratc" or a -cry for help· 
bdore she asb for assistance; ill this case she needed to pay the outstanding halant-e OIl her t"ar 
insurant"e so that she m uld usc the ('ar 10 get to work. 
Respondents' narratives revealed that their disdain for govemmelll assistance and their 
reluctance to use social nelworks for finandal assislance was rooted in a desire 10 maintain a 
self-sufficient, finandaJly independent identity. This desire was often in mnfiict with economic 
reality, however. and respondents were often confronted with situations in which they did not 
bave eoough mODey to make eods meet. They rumed to governmeJJt assistancc programs and 
their sociill nClworks for belp with immediate and pressing ffi<tteriaJ oeeds, which were most often 
related to food, shelter, <md oecessities for the chiJdreo. Debts and bi.lb; usuaJJy received a lower 
priority because nonpaymem would not have i.mmediate repercussions on their material well-
being; only when nonpayment threatened material well-heing. such as having utilities shut off or 
not being able to get to work, was it .lCceptab1c to ask network members for i1ssistancc. As iI rt""Sult 
debts were usually dealt with in private even when assistant"C frolll networks or non profiL~ was 
available, and families developed an extensive set of personal coping strategies to manage thei.r 
bills on their own. TIleir desire 10 promote a responsible, self-sufficient identity also shaped th e 
coping strategies they adopted towards particular debts. 
Debt Coping Strategies 
The personaJ copiog strategies families used to m<mage their bi.lb; arc described io Table 3. 
We separate out Massistaocc· slrateglcs, sucb as relying on govcmrneot. nonprofit. <md oetwork 
Table J Debt Ma na.qemenl Strategks 
SlTtilegy 
Assistilncc stralt'gics 
Sodal networks 
Nonprofit assistance 
EITC refund 
IIJdividua tizcd strategies 
Debt j uggling 
Pay on time 
Employment 
Go without 
I'rrcenl (Jf Oebrs Mtlnaged by 
11.8 
4 .3 
28.9 
26.9 
15.6 
21.9 
95 
5.0 
Exilmp/es 
Borrow from family or friends 
Get assislilncc from non proUts 
Usc EITC rd'und to pay 
Skip a bill or rotate bills 
Pay un U'''' hi!) wilh crt:dit "ard o r wkt: uul 
loan tu I"'y bills 
Pay It-ss Ihall ",inimum 
Rejt"CI. rL""SIK",sihilily 
tgntJrL' il 
Misin lonnation 
Pay amount due 
I'ay more than the minimum 
Take on extra shilts or hours 
Work extra jobs 
Hold off on purchases 
Go without ccnain services 
Notr. 1'I:ll'Cnl~l!':S 3,,: b~St;d un Ihe 55ll inMan",,; 01 <"lIm:nl o r ret,,"1 ,ld'i i,klllil.:d ill Ollr sample. V.tIlL"$a,M "I' lu IT"><C II .. " 
100 tK"",,USC sur",: rcSjK"MknlS uSt~1 """" 11~'n O.K: ' 1r~IL"lIY 10 ",an~!II: a 1'''r1~"lar ,rd,l. 
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Ta ble 4 • Perrenrage of Fami/ie$ u ril izing Dl'br Managemmr Srrar'1}ilS, 
by Family I ncome 
Under $16,000 $16,OOOL$26.000 $26.00/A..S40,000 
Social network.s 
" " 
, 
Nonprofit assistanct" 3 6 3 
Go wlthout 4 6 5 
IgnorclR1<-"CI 
" " '" Debt juggling 35 29
" UrnplUYTIlent 
" 
, 
" Pay un time n 
" " Usc [lITe Tt:fund 
" " " 
N(}(c. Value< add ul' 10 mo", thao 100 beca"", lamilies can lI<C ""'''' lhan nne 'lta~y to 
manage a pa<1 iruiar debL 
suppon. from "individualized" strategies families developed to cope with debt on tbeir own. The 
three most common of these individualized strategies were: I I ) debt juggling, which involved 
skipping or rowtmg bill payments each month, 12) paying on time, which involved paying the fu ll 
amount due or more than the minimum, and 13) ignoring or rejecting a debt, which involved 
complete nonpayment. 
The payment ~trategy a respondent adopted towards a particular debt was hased in part upon 
his or her fillanoa l situation and ahility \0 pay. Tahle 4 shows the payment strategies uscd uy 
respondents based on Iheir household income, with our sample divided into equal thirds. Not 
surprisingly, those with more disposable income were more likely to pay all of their debts on time 
or to pay more than the minimum. J ust 13 percent of the debL~ held by families with incomes less 
than $ 16,000 were paid on time, compared to 18 percent of the debts among families with 
incomcs between $ 16,000 and $26,000. and 32 percent of the debts among families with incomes 
over $26,000. 
What is even more striking about Table 4, however, is the great heterogrodty of debt man-
agement strategies employed by fami lies of similar economic Sla nding. There is more varia tion 
within income grOllps than across them, suggesting that the ability 10 pay is not the only factor 
drivin g decisions a bout how to manage one's deblS. In addition, we found that the same family 
often \Js~d diHer~nt debt management strategies to handle different debts, ignoring some while 
juggling others, fo r example. III faL1, only 16 p~rc~nt of families ill our sample used one debt 
management strategy consistently for all th~ir debts. Twenty-s~ven p~rc~nt of respot1(l~nts us~d 
Iwo strategies, 26 percent used three, and 28 percent used four or more strategies 10 ha ndle 
various debts. 
Table 5 summarizes the various combinations of management strategies employed by families 
in our sample. Of respondents who used each management strategy, it shows the percentage that 
also used each of tbe otber strategies. This table highligbts the vaSI heterogeneity in approaches 
Ta ble 5 • Combinafions of Dl'bl Management Slrafeg ie$ Ulilized by Rt'Spondentf 
Of RespondmlS I'rrccnl Who also Uud 
Who Used 
Nt tworks NonprojilS IgnortlRtj«t JU.lJ9ling Pay on Timt I:iFFC Refund 
Nl1works 12 35 47 32 60 
Nonprofits 32 55 4 5 41 55 
Ignorc/nojl"CI 32 l8 55 26 54 
J uggling 28 .. 36 
" " P~y on time 22 .. 20 55 53 
me refund H 
" 
33 
" " 
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used by respondellis in our sample, and they often utilized strategies that were quite inconsistelll 
with one another. Note, for example, that 36 percent of respondents who juggled one or more of 
their bills also ignored at least one of their bills. And of respondents who paid consistently 011 one 
bill, 20 percent ignored auother bill. 
To understand the sources of this heterogeneity in approaches to debt management. we 
examined the narratives and rationales within respondents' qualitative accounts of their debts 
and debt payment strategies. We fo und that the coping strategies families used were not only a 
flllK1.ion of tllt~ir ahil ity to pay or th~ result of a rational cak'l lation of how to r~duee thdr deht 
burden most ~fficiently; r<lther, debt m<lnagemem strategit-s were adoptt:d bast-d on larger narra-
tive identities through wttich families understood their debts. Most debts were understood within 
a narrative of making ends mcct. in whleh debt payments were a portion of the many bills thal 
must be paid each month. These debts were juggled on a rotating basis that prevented them from 
going into t·o Jlet1.i(lIls hut also prevented famil it-s from making much progress in paying them ofr. 
In contrast, debts that symboJi7.cd percdved injustices were oflen ignored or reject~d; paying 00 
them would signify acceplilncc of unfairdrcumslilnccs and aclrnowledgi.ng mislilkes, while ignor-
ing them allowed respondents to mentally absolve responsibility and preserve their identities 
as financially respomihle individuals. Pinally, ddltS that w~re understood as part of a joumey 
towards a desired identity or soLial mobility goal wer~ paid most consistently, somdimes ~ven at 
thc ~xpensc of other material Il(:a:ssitics, bt"GIuSC paymcnt resonated with respondents' l)()Sitive 
aspintional identities. 
The Making Ends Meet Narrative: JUfJ.'1ling Debts, When income was inadequ<lte, tbe most com-
mon individual approach to payi.ng outstanding debts was to juggle them, a practice one respon-
dent aptly d~serihed as Mrobbing Pder to pay Paul. ~ In fact, 27 percent of our r~spondents reported 
juggling at least one debt payment, including paying on one dcbt in one month and a different 
debt in another month, paying on one debt for a spun of time and thell stopping for a while, 
payingjllSt part of the tota l arnOllll t due on each hill. Parnilies who used th~se s t rategi~s w~re 
constantly thinking about their debts and making efforts to pay them, but often they were not 
able to make 10 ng-temI progress on paying debts off with this approach. Instead, they juggled 
Ihem to keep them from going into coJle(,:tiom or default; they "got by,M bUI did not make 
progress towards gO<lls or fed anger or resentment towards lenders. Most famil ies who 
adopted juggling strategies like these viewed their debt payments as part of the delicate balan-
dng act of making ends meet eaeh month. There were often fewer immedia te repereussions 
for not paying one's debts, so they took lower priority than regular monthly expenses like rent 
or groceries. Every couple months respondents would come up shon on cash and would not 
be able to pay the full monthly installments due on all of their debts. When this happened, 
they would deploy the debt juggling str<ltegics of partial or rot<lting p<lyment5. When we asked 
Bryn Gamble, a white single mother who cohabited with ber daughter's father, for example, 
how she paid on her bills, she told us "I'm not giving them any more than they need. As Imy 
mom] used to say, like r have to rob Peler to IWY Paul. Like I have to take from one bill to pay 
another bill.· 
Coral Nicholson, a widow with a 15 -year old son who works <IS a medical assistant, 
described how this strategy worked for her: "Righ t now the regu lar phone is cut off, l)Ower biJI 
is douhled, so it's like I'm Iwying Paul for Peter, like from week-to-week. I wish I could just 
have o ne whole month where I could pay every bill on time in the entire amount. But wi th 
111~ I can't, it ' s alwa ys sOll1ething, I have to pay on it or make arrangement to pay this date or 
what have you ... Like with the phone hill I wait till it geL~ to the part wh~r~ you get th~ dis· 
connection ootice and then I'll call.· Similarly, Glo ria Diaz, a blaek single mother of two, told 
us " lI 'm ) just surviving. I would have to ehoose ... like one month I'll pay my bill and I would 
leave one without paying. next month that's the one I have to pay." Like many reslXJIldents, 
Gwen Bickford, a while single mother of two who was reccntly laid off from her job as a 
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receptionist at a tanning s.alon, told us her priorities were basic necessities; it was pointless to 
try to pay on other bills with a limited income: 
Rem coml'S before everything and I mean as Jongas my kids have food and dothl'Son their back and stua, 
you know, t dOI]'t-1 try !lot to stress myscU OUI thin\tin' of those th.ing5 [billsl bt.'CiJUSC right now at this 
point ill time likt: I can', just even prioritize a biIJ btxousc it's like I reaUy have !IO income comin' in, 
These (Juoles reveal how familit'S vicwt'd the debts they were juggling-they were pan of a 
IJ<llandng act of making ends meet on a tight monthly budget by focusing on IJ<lsic n ect'Ssitit'S and 
putting off bills tha t have rew immediate repercussions, A debt would "jump up· on the list or 
priorities if it started to affect their material well-being. such as when they were told that their 
cle(1ridtyor phone service would he disumnt"t-1ed, As one respondent told us, " I'm alwayll a 
month behind, but I. you know, I give them what it lakes to keep it on , , , It never gets turned 
off," Respondents who juggled debts talked abont these debts in their narratives of how they ·get 
by: not in their narratives about goals, aspirations, or economic mobility, They also did not speak 
abont them with anger, 
The Tlljustice Narrative: 'glloring Debt, In some instances, debts lOok on special meanings and 
were excluded from the bundle of expenses involvt'{l in the narrative of making ends meet. In 
partitular, famjlies ignort'{l or stopped paying on debts that were damaging to their identitks as 
finanrially r(~ponsihle individuals, whidl ou:urred when they were angry at the drtumstant'Cs 
under whidl the de ht had bt'Cn accrued, how they were treated, or when a deht was too large and 
overwhelming \0 handle, This hapJlCned to Claire I-Iaynes, who got her first credit card when 
she was J 8, shortJy after she gave birth to her first daughter, Hailey. She got the card from a mail 
advertisement sent to her apartment. She qualified for a $300 credit limit on the card, but unfor-
tunalely Claire never got to use it. She told us 
When I gOI it. Jthcrcl was like 4O·something dollars availabk. So you already owe them like $250 
when you first gl1 the card .. . And there was a $35 late [cc, and Jan] over the limit kc. II you got 
a laIC kc, you immediately went over tbe limil ... Tbey give you a $300 card, but they take out all 
$80 JIlDuaJ fee and they take out a one-time [activationl lee. By the time they're done taking aU the 
lee; nl[ the ("Jcd, yOIl only got like $'10 to ~llt'nd. So then I called tllem, and I was like ... I haven ' t 
even u~d Ihe card_ I'm likt:, you know wha\? I don'l t:vcn want il. And tIley wt:rt: likt:, well fine, Ihell 
dun't uSC it. tlUl.l did,,'t know il was slill accumulating alilhis timt'. I told tl,em I didn't wantlh" rurd. 
But Ilhqlll"vt:reklSt:d it, so il slill k'-']lI gning UI'. And Ih"n rinally 1 calkd Ih"m, and I was lik" lislen. 
II you dou't make the charges SLOp now, I'm going 10 sue you h"cJUSC I don't want it. I n"v", kn"w 
Ih"y had cards lik" Ihal. 
Now 25 years old, Claire still has this credit card that she refuses to pay but it now has an $840 bal-
ance, even though she never charged a pemly 10 it. She was angry enough that she threatened 10 
sue them, but she n ever actually took action; she simply ignores the debt. 
Other respondents voiced sinrnar anger at being ·dupcd~ by credit card companies and, like 
Clal.rc, rejected the debt, or the portiO!] of the debt, they deemed unfair, CoriDe Samuels, a black 
single mother who takes care of bOlh her daughter and granddaughter, told us she gOl a simila:r 
$300 tTed il card, hilt 
I only gol a hundred_ ]n'e n.:dil <.:art! <:O"'I .. ~nyllook 011\ all Ihe fl"CS _ . what was it. $85 arUlllal fee, this 
I"e and Ihal f"" a",llh"nlhey only ~Ol a $ 100, and now you tdl Ill" lowe you $5,(MIOI ... il I go In wun 
I'm giving Ilh"III I hack $300, ]Ihey] ain't gelling IU. $5,000. 
Similarly, another respondent told us how he started out with a card with a $300 limit, bUI the biU 
was now over $600 with interest: MSO I didn't spend more than 300, it's j ust that that's all the 
interest. They were teying to tell me 600 and something. which ( told them that they weren't 
gonna get, espedal1y since my credit limit was 300 and (Ilever got to 300. So they run lake the 
six and wish for it all they want.· 
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Some rN;pondents initially tried to pay on these debts, only to become discouraged by the 
compoUllding interest rates and late fees that swamped their modN;t payment attempts. They [cit 
like they couldn't make a dent ill the debt even when paying the amount due on their bill each 
month. as a finanaaUy responsible person should do, which ultimately led them to stop paying. 
For example, Nathan, a bus driver, and his wife, Maryam, who tive with their five children in 
public housing. used to use a credit card for regular grocery shopping. clothes for the Idds, and 
other monthly eXllCnst'S. One dilY, Nilthiln went over the credit limit without reilli:rjng it, i1nd 
acmrding to Nathan, the credit card company charged him $19 every month that he was over the 
limit. lie kept ]lutting the minimum amoollt due towards the bill every month, but the balant"C 
Ilever wenl dowll given the recurrillg charges alld interest. Pinally, Nathall said, M] keep paying.. 
but this guy Ithe cardl is never finished . I said forget it; I'm not going to pay it . . . ' When we asked 
him how much the balance was on the card now, he said MI don't know right now, I ignore them.~ 
lle went on to say ~l was willing to pay, but these guys the over limit by $39, $39. I kept telling 
them, cut it off plcase, plcilSC. Nothing. listen, it's better nat to pay.~ Although he initially tried to 
pilY, Nathan ended up fnlstratcd i1nd fuJillly noncomptiant when his effons at paying the bill 
seemcd to do oothing to rcduce the debt. 
These rcspondeuts i1re uot i1lone in their frustriltiOIl. Stories of being Mduped " by ("fedi.! 
Gird tumpilnies-by biddcn fet'S, Iille fees, over-limit fet'S, i1nd i1stronomical interest riltes-
wcre IlCrvilsive, and this perceived injustice often trilnslilled into rcluctilnce to pily on the 
debt or oUlTight rejection of it. Although credit Cilrds were the most common types of debt 
to be ignored, otlll.~rs reported simila r experienl"t~s with hank overdraft fees, cell phone COI11-
panies, and even medical bills. In such cases, the perception of deceitful and harassing 
behaviors from lenders led people to reject the basis of the debt and allowed them to, at 
least psychologically, absolve themselves of the responsibility of repayment. Sometimes the 
rejection of the debt occurred swiftly and immediately, as was the case for Claire after she 
received her first astronomical credit card statement full of fees, but other times tbe rejec-
tion occurred after a longer period of good-faith effort, as was the case [or Nathan after he 
finally discovered that his monthly paymeuts were no match for the hldden interest rales 00 
his credit card. While providing some modicum of d ignity and peace of mind, ignoring such 
debts often had diSilstrOliS conse(lli ences for respondents' credit riltings and total debt hillan-
ces, i1S la te fees i1nd nonpilyment fees continued to i1CCTlle and bills were sent to collettions 
agencies. 
11te Economic Mobility Narrative: Priorilizing and Paying C.onsi~·lently. Other dehl~ were under-
stood as special in a posi tive way, as part of the path towards achieving a positive financial identity 
or goal. such as owning a home. In these cases, families were motivated to payoff their debts and 
adopted disciplined budgeting and repayment SlrategiN;, even at tbe expense of basic necN;sitics. 
Having a coucrele economic or residential mobility goal for tbe future seemed to Idck start a 
pallem of behavior in which families prioritized paying off their debts above almost everythlng 
else. Many of the respoodents who adopted dill; approach were following what may be consid-
ered ecooomiC<llly rationaJ bebavior, but in their na.rr.lIives we discovered that what often moved 
a fam ily from juggling their debts eaeh month to priorili:rjng them and paying con~islentJy WilS tbe 
tT)'stalli:r,ation of iI mobility goal or desired social identity, such as b(~coming iI homl'Owner. The 
power of this identity WilS evidem in the filtt that milny filmjijes who were in no financial position 
to purchase a home weft~ motivated \0 get their fjnanl"t~S in order because of this dream, even if it 
was unlikely to be realized. 
This is what happened to Monica Lourdes, a 42-year-old married Pueno Rican mother. 
After years of living in a cramped three bedroom apartment with her husband, three children, and 
the husband and child of her eldest daughter, Monica decided that il was tillIe to get her own 
home so she could finally provide the space for her filIllily thaI she always wanted. She told 
her husband "at the end of this year, we should be looking into gelling the house.~ Monica and 
ber husband owc ilbout $<1,000 on three differeD! credit cards, which thcy hild been juggling 
Robhi ng PClcr to Pay Paul 15 
for years amongst the other monthly expenses. When we asked her about her plans for debt in the 
coining year, MoniGl said 
Debt. I'm hoping to eliminate Ihal word. [do want 10 gCI the home. I already look a homebuy,ds dass. 
Ilookt.:d iolO ... Ihe Credit Sman program [offered Ihrough Ihe cilyl, where you take cl.lsscs and Ihey'll 
show you how w fix yourcRwt, howto 00\ faU inloothertrJps.llkecrcdil cards, again .. . I'm hoping and 
praY;J}g and if t:vcryth.ing IUfIlS uul wen by OCl.:cmOCr wc shuuld hc looking iulo buying the r.nol homc. 
To reach this goal, they arc no longer juggling debl~; they arc ~pay ing bills left and right, left and 
right. ~ They have been trying to payoff their credit cards, and arc cUUing hack on everything else 
to make this possible. While thei r in(.umes haven't changed, each ramily memher gOC'll to the 
food pantry once a week to get groceries, they have cut back on providing financial support to 
their other rela tives, stopped buying DVDs, and Monica has tried to quit smoking beca use 
she ~tallied up" how much it rust her. Monica is even thinking of getting a serond job. When 
dC"SClibing this she laughed and ~d, 'You can tell I really want this house, right?" Monica's story 
illustrates many economically rational behaviors, including prioritizing her debts, seeking credit 
roWlSCLing,. aJJd possibly working more in order to save for a down payment OD a bouse, but wbat 
motivated these changes in ber debt managemeDl was the crystallization of her goal to become 
a homt.-owner. 
Alyssa Jackson, a black divorced mother of six, also has her eye on a home in the fut\lre. 
Though she has not bl.:en able to OJt oock as much as Monica's family, she IJ<lYS more than tbe 
minimum each mOllth on her largest debt, a Visa credit canl. When we a~ked her why ~he paid 
more than the minimum 011 tha t bill Alyssa told us it was "because I want one day to buy me a 
house, so I want to come up out of debt." When we asked more abouttiIis strategy, she said ~ 1' tl1 
trying to pay all my bills off. I'm trying to pull myself up out of debt so I can-J want a house one 
day. I want to pay for my own house instead of renting somebody else's house. I want to be taking 
that rent pay [and) puning it towards my house_" 
Man y families mentioned long-tenn eronomic and rcsidemial mobility goals as the moti-
vating forces behind steady debt repayment, which of teD entailed sacrillcc in other areas of Iile. 
Not all families were ultimately successful at reducing their debts after emoorking OD this strategy, 
bUI they took steps to t.-ducale themselves about how to achieve their goal. When they did Ihis, 
they quickly learned thai debt was standing in the way of getting a good mortgage or loan rOlle, 
and they had hurt their credit ratings hy not paying on (.Tedit ca rds amI other hJ<lns. To ~tart 
improving their credit, familiCli made personal payment plans so they could make (."()f1sistent prog-
ress on their dehts, started paying down their dehl~ with the highest interest rates, and focused on 
improving their credit scores. At this point, the debt took on a new meaning. No longer was it part 
of a package of monthly expenses to deal with each month, it was now a oorrier to achieving thei.r 
goal and paying represented steps towards achieving it. In this way, the crystallization of a mobi-
lity goal led families 10 adopt the eronomically optimal practices they would need 10 achieve it. 
Sometimes it also motivated them to seek OUI assistancc in paying on their debts, most often in 
the [orm of homeownership rourses offered by local governments or nonprofit organi7.ations. 
More often tbaJJ not, however, families worked on pa ying off these debts with little assistance. 
GOl'emment and Nonprofit Assistance. Few fami lies in our 5.1mple received assistant"C wi th thei r 
dehts or knew of public, private, or nonprofi t resouru~s to help them manage their dehts. In part, 
this is ix-cause these types of assistance arc rare tThorne amI Porter 2007). Nonprofi t organi7.a tiolls 
orfer a palchwork or finandal literacy (."(JIIrses, but most of our responden L~ were not aware of 
such rourses. Nor is debt assistance offered as part of participation in other types of government 
programs, like subsidized hOUSing or food stamps.4 Although low-income fa milies have access to 
4. One excl"J.tion 10 lhis;, low-i.ocome hOIJl~"OWJ1CThhip progr~ms. sud! a, Ihe Sn1ion 8 lIoml"'OWlle,.,;hip l'mg",m and 
li.,;l lime hnrnd"'yt:r <"'OIIfS<:S ollcrnt loy "'Hlp""il h(.'K~'W'K: .,;h;1' "llCn<ie, . Mally 0 1 Ihese I'rog"'Hll$ oITere,t li""noal 
lih:ri>Cy «-"S<"H<"<-"S I ..... low_;,,"'''''' 1""'iliCi. 
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nonprofit aid in thc form of heating assistancc, food pantries, and free !<lX preparation semces, 
they do not have similar types o f assistance for debt counseling at the illStilUtions they typically 
turn 10 for help. Even though these programs pay for expenses that then free up fWlds to pay on 
debts, families do not understaDd the assistance tbey recdve in this wily nor did il help to educale 
them or develop pilymem strillegles. In shon , Inilny of the forms of nonprofit and government 
assistance to wttich families could reluctantly tum when in [leed were simply not viable resources 
when it came to thdr debts. 
There was one major ext"eption to this lack of government a~i~tanl."t~: tax time was s~n by 
many as an ideal t ime to pay off OllL~tanding debL\. Most lower-income fami lies (IUalify for a 
refundable tax credit in the form of the Earned inmrne Tax Credit mITC), ~)mdimes totaling 
several thousand dollars. This allows one to make a large enough payment to eliminate, or sub-
stantially reduce, debt, getting the debt collectors off of their backs, and gill ing them a Mclean slate~ 
again, at least for a while. In fact 29 percent of the debts held by our respondents were paid 
on with the lax refund. Because of the sizable amount of the rdund checks (on average seycral 
thousand doUars). tbose who did contribute some rehmd dollars to debt reduced their deb-t 
burdellS by an average of 50 percent. 
Why were respoodents reluctant 10 rely 00 network assist.1ncc or government progra.llJ5. 
but wiUing, i1nd indt"ed eilger, to rely on the F.ITC? Respondents i.n our s.ample did nOI view the 
F. ITe as iI form of government i1ssistance, like welfare, but rather i1S a cash bonus for working. This 
buttressed, rilther t hiln undermined, rt-spondents' self-conceptions i1S independent and n .-spon-
sible workers and parenl\. r or example, many respondents discussed "earning" o r -deservingM the 
refund because they Mwork hard." Because families know that they receille the rdund in part 
because they work, virtually all see the refund as something that they eamed. ra ther than as a 
handout from the govemment. This perception is reinforced by the fact that the credit is lum~d 
together in a single refund check with actual tax refund dollars from over-withholding, and 
because they claim their rcfund in tax offices like millions of more affiuent families. A more 
detailed elaboration o f how families view the EITC is outside the sco~ of this article and available 
elsewhere IHalpem-Meekin et al . forthcoming; Mendenhall et ill. 20 12; Romich and Weisner 
2000; Sternberg Greene 20 I J; Sykes et al. 20 13); the key finding from this literaillre is thilt EITe 
redpients do not view the EffC as iI government handout or form of dependenl"C. This explains 
why our respondents were eager to claim the refund and used it to p<ly on their debts. 
Discussion 
Debt plays a key role in the reproductiOll of social inequalities (Conley 1999, 2001; Harris, 
F.vans, and Becken 20 10; Keister 2000(1,2004; Oliver and Shapiro 1995; Shapiro 2(04). While 
access to credit provides benefits to lower-in lume familks, failure to repay can have nq,;ative con-
sequences for social mobility by reducing job prospects, as m<lny employers check credit rq)(Jrt:; 
when making hiring dedsions mayot 2004), by IimiLing hOUSing options that require credit 
checks iTIlOfile 2007), and by restriLting au~ss to banks and lending institu tions for new aUtJUnL ... 
or offering less favorable tenm for loans (Caskey 1994; Porter 2008). This traps dehtors by pre-
venting them from improving credit scores and by restricting access to consumption-smoothing 
credi t (Squires 2004). Debt also increases material hardship by diverting resources towards 
its repaymcllI rather thall going to current consumption, sa vings. or assCl aecumulillion. 
Although the role of debt in reprodudng inequality is clear. the meanings and copi.ng strate-
gies associated with debt were largely unexplored by previous rescarch. We showed that families' 
bebavioral TL'Sponscs 10 tbeirdcbts arc related not only to their fmanriai ability to PilY, 10 "riltional~ 
cost-benefit calcu.lations, or to psychological "errors,· but also to the varied sociill identities and per-
sonal nilrratives in wh.idl the debts were embedded. We identilkd th.rL"e dis\.inlt narratives: 
the making ends m l"et nilrrative, the injustice nilrriltive, and the economic mobilily narrative. 
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A common thread through all of Ibese naffiltives was the strong desire for families 10 maintain 
social identities as financially independent, responsible ctti7£ns. 
These naffiltives influenced how families went about paying on their debts. Debts embedded 
withio making ends meet narratives were seen as pan of the IOrai package of monlbJy expc= 
and payment Wil5 thus understood as part of the delicate juggling act of securing basic necessities 
on a limited budgct. for debts tbat were embedded withiJl injustice narratives, paying meant 
acknowledging fail ure o r acquiescing to unfair drolmstanccs. for example, paying on \Inantid-
paled late ke~ or overdrafl fees meant implicitly an:cpling that they had 1K.""e11 ignorant of the 
terms of the nedil arrangement. These debL~ were most likely to be ignored. In l.\Jn tra~t, debL~ that 
were seeil as pan of ajoumey towards el.1l11omic mobili ty were more likely to be paid consi~telltJy 
or used as motivation to seek assistance. Payment provided a feeling of pride and accomplishment 
because respondents understood it as movemenl towards tha t goal o r desired identity. While 
economic standing is dearly associated with the abili ty to pay on debL~, o ur resulL~ suggest thai this 
is a necessary but not a sujJiciml condition for debt repayment. Economic standing did not explain 
the great heterogeneity in strategies families adopted 10 manage their debts. 
f amilies did use some of the strategies described m tbe sociological economic coping lite-
rature 10 help payoff debts---sodal [letwork. government. aud [Ion profit agency assistance-
but these strategk s were significantly less oommon. few familks sought help from their soda I 
networks 10 help them repay their debts. Even though they did rely on friends and family to help 
with regular month.1y expenses when they were m d ire nl."Cd, they did so at a co~t to their personill 
pride and sense of i ndeJlelldeTIl.'C. Th us, respondents only asked their networks for assistance with 
debls when nonpayment would have an immediate and detrimental effect on their material 
well -being. Since illey were often able 10 put off paying down Iheir debt, they did not [cd the 
personal cost made it worth asking for help. 
The strategies families used to deal with their debts were largely individualistic in forus, 
involving the rearrangement of existing money. In pan, this is due 10 the fact that there is a 
comparatively extensive patchwork of governmental and nonprofit programs designed to help 
families make ends meet for food and shelter, through the provisio[l of welfare and food stamps OJ 
througb nonprofit cnergy assistance programs. The primary sources of assistancc rcl,ltcd 10 debl-
Ililoknlptcy, debt consolidation, Cfl.·di t counseling- were largely unutili7.ed by the lower-inl.ume 
filmiJil."S in our study, consistent with national studies ~ Wilrren 2003; Warren and Thome 20 12). 
We identified one notable eXl.'Cption to th is Ililllem, which was the large role of tax rdund~, 
rel."("ived through Ihe Earned [nmllle Tax Credil (cITC) and other rdundable lax uediL~, iTlllilying 
off deht. Thi.~ is mnsislent with other research nn the ElTC, which has found that iL~ primary use is 
to payoff debl (Mendenhall el al. 20 12; Smeeding el al. 2000) . 'nIe EITC was not viewed as a form 
of government assistance, but as a reward for working and parenting. so receipl was nOI damaging 
to sdl-wonh in tbe same way as other government cash assistance like welfare. 
Our lTIults highlight how the narrative identity of culrural sociology can be used 10 under-
stand Ibe financial decision making of lower-income populations. We build upon previous work 
in economics and sociology by dorumcnting how tbe social identities and personal narratives 
families developed to Ullderstand their finandal situations infIuenccd tbe actions they took 
towards their debts. Rather than pursuing only the most cost effective approaches to debt repay-
ment, families ildopted striltegies for paying on their debts thai were consisten t with their persona I 
narratives and that butlressed their identities as finandally respomihle and self-sufficient dti7.cn~. 
III additirlll, the p["()("Css of narrativi7.ing provided a means for respondents to resist or reinterpret 
the idelllities that had been aSl.Tibed to them hy the <.Tedilor institutiom. Some resJlondenL~ uscd 
Ihe narralive process as a form of pSydlOlogical res istance againslunj ust credilOrs, while o thers 
used it as a foml of psychological affinnation that bolstered their motivation to achieve Ibeir 
mobility goals. 
Our findings add 10 the behavioral eoonomic model of financial behilvior. Despite its sen~i­
tivily to contextUil l fill."tors, the behavioral eOO[lomic model hils il limited undeP-otilndmg of the 
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actual social contexts in which the poor navigate their financial lives because it develops 
and manipulates identities in controlled experimental sett ings rather than in the real world. 
Our work adds 10 this research tradition by describing how adults' desire 10 promote posi-
tive, fiDandally sell-sufficient identities infIuenccs their perceptions and maDagement of debts; 
those f.ramed as threatening this identity arc most likely to be ignored while those framed a5 
appealing to this ide ntity arc most likely to be paid coosi5temly. Behavioral economic researchers 
(1)uld dl"Sign experiments to test our study rl"Sults and further understa nd their implications for 
program and polilY design. 
III knns of polilY, our resull~ indialte that app.ealing to positive, scH-suffident identities or 
offering rewards that further mobility goals (ould strongly "nudge" hehaviors. For example, 
homeownership programs for low-income families that offer a combination of debt management 
services and homeownership preparation courses and serviO's would be beneficial sinO' the debt 
repaymelll piece of the program would be direcrly tied 10 a mobility goal. Additionally, college 
savings programs could be. tied to debt repayment. CredilOrs may wallllO rethink some of their 
ha.rshest tactics for coUecring debts, and instead consider innovative programs that promote repay-
ment with an eye towards promoting the mohility goaJ.s of those who owe. For eXillllple, they 
could offer inccotivcs for repayment such as directing a small perccmage of the anJOlmt repaid to 
college savings OIccounts. The kderal government could offer such a program directly or could 
offer lTeditors incen tives to lTeate such programs. 
A potential lTitique of our rl"Sults is that fami lks dl"SCTibcd the meanings they assodated 
with debts as a post-hoc rationalization justifying their ability or inability to pay. The challenge 
to this critique is that it cannot explain why the same respondenl took multiple approadles to man-
aging their debts, sudl as simultaneously juggling some bills while completely ignoring others 
jwhieh occurred with 36 percent of our respondents). Likewise, it does not explain why some 
families could pay on an outstanding debt but chose Dot to. Finally, it docs not explain why some 
families changed lheir approaches to cenain debts over time without concomitant changes in 
their finandal circumstances, sudl as after dedding tIley wanted to own a home. 
We also acknowledge severallimit,ltioos of our data. First, our interviews were notlongi-
tudinal. so we could not follow families prospectively over time to detennine how successful 
they were at paying orr their dehts in the long term. lnstead, we had 10 rely on respondents' 
descriptions of what they were doing currently, what they planned to do, and what they had 
done in the paslto altegorize their approa<:hes to debt repayment. Since we rely OJ) families' 
self-rqlorts, it is possible thaI families did not tell us about all of their dehL~, that they over- or 
umlcrrepresented their tota l amount of debt, or that they over- or underemphasized some 
coping strategies they used to address their debt. Our study focuses on the lower part of the 
income distribution, so we cannot tell whether the circumstances we identified surrounding 
debt accumulation or the strategies used to repay them would apply to more affluent families. 
Future rcscarch might uncover interesting commonalities or d ifferences across social strata . 
Additionally, our interviews lOok place before the recession that began in 2008. The crisis 
highlighted many of the predatory and exploiwtive lending practices cxperieneed by families 
in our stu dy aod made it more difficult for fantilies obtaill credit. although it did UtIle to ease 
the debt burdens of lower-income families. Filially. our sample consists of families who 
received the EITe. whicb allowed liS to larget a lower-income sample, but. we miss the approx-
imatcly 25 percent of innllne-eligible families who do not claim the EITC refund and who may 
he systematically distinct from those who arc eligible and do clai m. Additionally, fOCUS ing on 
the E1TC-cligible population restri(1S the age ra nge of our sample to households with ch ild ren, 
which means that very old and very young households and childless adults will be under -
represented. It also restricts the sample to those who arc employed, who may differ from 
the lowest-income individ uals who have no earned income. If these groups arc somehow 
more or less advantaged than the families who do claim the refund, this could bias the overall 
distribut.ion of debt maDagement strategies we observed. 
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Culrural influences on debt behaviors have imponant impliGitions for economic policy. While 
many credit card companies employ aggressive, and often misleading, advenising approaches 10 
sign up new users, our results suggest that these debts are the ones respondents were most resistant 
to pilying off if they perceived them as unJai.r. While these practices arc quite lucrative for credit 
Gird companies, in some cases tbey may backfire. Ye t families illtempted to payoff all kinds of 
debts when they were motivilted by a socioeconomic mobility gool. Once they took steps to achleve 
thilt dt"Sin.:d gOil l, they learned that debt stood in the way. The most common example of this 
was a~piratioll S of hOlllt::owncrship, whirll motivatcd fam ilit"S to prioritize their bills and make 
serious dforl~ to pay them off, even if it TIleant sacrifiting bask [lct'essiti t"S. Based OIl thesc fin d-
ings, finantia l education and outreach, increased transpa rclll:.y by tTeditors, and savings ami repay-
ment programs tha t appeal to the positive self-identities and mobility goals of debtors could 
be successful polit)' strategies for motivating families to reduce debt and improve savings and 
spending behavior. 
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